About-Face: Critics warm to the surge.

About-Face: Critics warm to the surge
National Review Online
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Sept 7, 2007

Daveed was previously embedded with B Battery several months ago. The article's focus is more public perception of how the war is going - no new information about 2-32, but mentions his time with them.

Hot in Tehran: Iran's global-warming agenda

Hot in Tehran: Iran's global-warming agenda
National Review Online
CBS News
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
July 27, 2007

Daveed was embedded with the 2-32 for a few days back in June.

Excerpt:

Iran’s most obvious maneuverings have been in Iraq, where it has long aided insurgent factions. During a recent trip to Baghdad, where I was embedded as a reporter, I found that virtually every American soldier feared the explosively formed projectile (EFP). This kind of bomb has been described as uniquely dangerous because “when it detonates, the concave end blows outward and melts into a bullet-shaped fragment that slices through armor and flesh.” Captain Greg Hirschey of the Army’s 717th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company told Wired of an incident where an EFP went through a Humvee, taking off both of the driver’s legs and also an arm. Lieutenant Patrick Henson of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery told me that he saw video in which an EFP went straight through a heavily armored Humvee and left an impact on the curb on the other side of the road. (Several Army sources corroborated his account.) Iran has been providing Shia insurgents with these deadly weapons. In 2005, Time reported that Iranian operative Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, who headed an insurgent network created by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, introduced EFPs to Iraq. In February of this year, the American military stated that EFPs had killed “170 American and coalition troops in Iraq,” and the numbers have continued to rise since then.

Baghdad: Embedded Provisional Reconstruction Teams

Baghdad: Embedded Provisional Reconstruction Teams
Counterterrorism Blog
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
May 31, 2007

A few days ago, I spoke with a U.S. official working for one of the new embedded provisional reconstruction teams (EPRTs) in Iraq. Last year ten provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs) were created throughout the country to operate parallel to the military. Each PRT was headed up by a foreign service officer; had a deputy from the U.S. Army; had at least one member from USAID; and had a bilingual, bicultural advisor (fluent in Arabic with a background that allows him to understand the Middle East). Typically there would be about ten people total working for a PRT. The PRTs were designed to further the U.S. mission in Iraq by helping to advance the political process of reconstruction in a variety of ways. Top-down change was characteristic of the PRTs: they would work with such political entities as city councils and the policymaking portion of a city's department of public works.

The EPRTs are different. Rather than operating separately from and parallel to the military, they are embedded within the military structure. Six EPRTs operate in Baghdad, three in Anbar, and one in Babil. Their structure is similar to that of the PRTs (run by a foreign service officer, featuring a U.S. Army deputy, a USAID member, a bicultural advisor, and other staffers) but rather than functioning in the top-down manner of the PRTs, the EPRTs are designed to make more of a difference at what the official called the "granular" level. That is, the EPRTs are integrated into the military's tactical operations, and are designed to advance reconstruction efforts on a street by street, neighborhood by neighborhood basis. I previously noted that the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery (with which I was embedded) has four lines of operation in the districts it patrols: security, governance, economy, and essential services. It is at this tactical level -- the level of how these lines of operation can be furthered -- that the EPRT is supposed to have an impact in helping to set the course for the units with which it works. The EPRTs help set this course all the way down to the platoon level.

The source working with the EPRT said that their job is as much "problem avoidance" as anything else. Moreover, because the EPRTs have only been active in Iraq for about six weeks, it's too early at this point to assess their effectiveness. However, I'll be interested to check in with people working with the new EPRTs several months down the line to see how this intriguing idea is working in practice.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

Featured Report from Iraq: A look at the surge from Baghdad (The Fourth Rail)

Featured Report from Iraq: A look at the surge from Baghdad
The Fourth Rail
By: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
May 29, 2007

Journalist Daveed Gartenstein-Ross was embedded with Pat's group --

U.S. strategy is not just military in nature. Rather, it is designed to eliminate some of the underlying conditions that sap the average Iraqi’s faith in the country’s civil society. For example, in the districts that 2-32 patrols -- Yarmouk and Hateen -- there are four lines of operation: security, governance, economy, and essential services. According to Major Brynt Parmeter, who works at the brigade level, the overall goals are to reduce sectarian fighting, increase the Iraqi security forces’ capabilities, and improve local government to empower it to provide the services that Iraqis need. The Iraqis lack a number of essential services. Right now the U.S. focus is on food centers, financial institutions, fuel, and medical needs—but the Iraqis are also lacking in trash collection, reliable sewers, electricity, and other services. The effect of the lack of essential services on Iraqis should not be underestimated. Gas cost 5 cents a liter under Saddam Hussein; now the official price has skyrocketed to about 70 cents a liter. But in practice it is far higher than that: according to Lieutenant Patrick Henson, there is only one government-run gas station in the Yarmouk district. When the long lines around the station are coupled with security concerns, it should come as no surprise that many Iraqis buy their gas from the black market, where prices can reach $2 a liter. In other words, Iraqis may be paying more for their gas than Americans -- and the average Iraqi income is substantially lower than the average American income.

Featured Report from Iraq: A look at the surge from Baghdad (The Fourth Rail)

Baghdad: Patrolling Yarmouk (part1)

Baghdad: Patrolling Yarmouk
Counterterrorism Blog
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
May 25, 2007

On May 23 and 24, I went on a couple of evening patrols in Baghdad's Yarmouk administrative district. I went with a platoon from the U.S. Army's 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery, with which I am embedded; they are working with the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division while in Iraq. The battalion of which 2-32 is a part is responsible for a large section of northwest Baghdad, which includes a couple of districts that have been hot lately, Kadamiyah and Mansour. But the districts that 2-32 patrols -- Yarmouk and Hateen -- are relatively quiet. The most dangerous aspect of patrols in those districts is the drive to reach them.

In a briefing earlier this week, I learned that 2-32 has four lines of operation: security, governance, economy, and essential services. During Wednesday night's patrol, the main objective was for the soldiers to introduce themselves to Iraqis on a couple of blocks and get the residents to fill out security surveys with basic information about themselves. The troops would also speak with the Iraqis, with the help of a translator, asking about their basic needs as well as follow-up questions geared to ferreting out a possible insurgent presence in the neighborhood.

On Wednesday's patrol I caught my first glimpse of Baghdad outside the wire in the daylight. The fact that a war is raging in this city is apparent at first glance, yet life goes on. Some of the areas we passed were composed of abandoned ruins and burned-out shells of buildings -- areas where nobody should want to set foot, not even in the daylight. Other areas were residential, with large handsome estates right next door to bombed-out buildings that must have been equally handsome years ago, before the American invasion. Some Iraqis walked down the streets casually, some were standing and conversing. Some -- particularly those with kids -- waved at the American Humvees as they passed, while others glared with manifest anger. All of the women I saw on the streets wore either burkas or heavy hijabs, and had male escorts. Although the roads themselves were relatively clean (almost certainly to reduce the chance of an IED attack), the sides of the roads were littered with trash.

I was told that there are subtle signs of whether a neighborhood is safe. One of the signs of a safe neighborhood is the presence of kids, and there were a large number of kids running around in the first neighborhood we visited. Some of the soldiers secured the street to make sure we didn't get ambushed, while the platoon leader, the translator, and a few soldiers went into houses to speak with the residents. While having a bunch of heavily armed American soldiers show up at your door unannounced must be a shock, the translator (who identified himself only as "Mo") did a good job of explaining what was going on to the residents. In every instance, the troops were invited in without incident.

At the first house we visited, the Iraqi men immediately said in English: "This is good neighborhood! It is safe neighborhood!" Lieutenant Kevin Mills of 2-32 would later tell me that this is the first thing Iraqis always tell them, "even if they're right next door to a couple of bombed-out buildings." He noted that for many, claiming the neighborhood is safe is a matter of honor: often it's only in the second or third line of questioning that you get a better read on the actual security situation, such as the fact that they heard mortar fire nearby or that a lot of strange men have been going in and out of a neighboring house at odd hours.

But this really did seem to be a safe neighborhood. The kids came right up and spoke to us with the raw enthusiasm that small children can have. When they realized that I spoke some Arabic, a throng of about five kids surrounded me. We made basic conversation, but mainly they asked me to give them things. The first thing they wanted was a football; when they realized I didn't have one, they decided they could settle for a lesser ball, and asked for a baseball. They then asked for money, for my helmet, for my anti-ballistic goggles.

The people in both of the neighborhoods we visited Wednesday were friendly. The neighborhoods were cosmopolitan, with a mix of Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. A couple of men we encountered claimed to have been generals in the old Iraqi army. ("We run into a lot of former generals," one U.S. soldier told me. "They must have had a lot more generals than our military does.") I particularly enjoyed watching one of the servicemen, Specialist Rene Hernandez, interacting with the Iraqis. One of the other soldiers explained that Hernandez was on his third tour in the Middle East and could speak enough Arabic to joke around with Iraqis. When I drew a bit closer to investigate, I found Hernandez speaking a mix of Arabic, English, occasional Spanish, and often just plain gibberish -- at one point impersonating a donkey, which drew raucous laughter from the young men he was speaking with.

(continued..)

Baghdad: Patrolling Yarmouk (part2)

Baghdad: Patrolling Yarmouk
Counterterrorism Blog
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
May 25, 2007

The residents had a standard battery of complaints in both neighborhoods we visited. Trash wasn't being picked up; the residents weren't receiving electricity from the city and had to rely on private generators; the price of gasoline was skyrocketing (it was 5 cents a liter under Saddam Hussein, and is now up to 70 cents a liter). I asked one of the platoon's senior men what they would do about these complaints, and he said that they would probably contract out things like trash collection and other services. Consistent with their goal of growing the country's economy, their preference is to contract these jobs out to Iraqis wherever possible.

The soldiers were proud of the difference they had made in the areas they were patrolling. Sergeant Vince Passero said that if I had been here when they first arrived in February, I would see how pronounced the change was: when they first arrived, there were more IEDs, more attacks, and the areas were less safe.

That first day of patrol, of course, does not represent the full picture of Iraq. According to recent opinion polls, about 60% of Iraqis think it's okay to kill U.S. troops. The second day of patrol provided a bit more of a glimpse of that other side of Iraq, as we were targeted by small arms fire a couple of times. The shots were far off the mark the first time; the second time, hours later, a bullet fired at us near the JSS ricocheted off a concrete barrier about eight feet away from our Humvee.

The people we encountered on the second patrol were also more distressed than the Iraqis we ran into the first night. One man, a white-haired gentleman who looked to be in his mid-fifties, had just lost his brother. "Iraq has no government, no government," he said emphatically. "In two years we are all dead. Nobody will protect us." Others spoke of the deteriorating security situation -- a point that was underscored when the soldiers tried to get information about a recent mortar attack that seemingly originated nearby. Most of the residents could provide nothing useful, explaining with a shrug that they hear mortars fired all the time.

At one point that night, we heard the sudden crackle of gun shots a few blocks away. Heavy gunfire continued for a short time, at least 20 to 30 seconds. After a quick effort to assess whether we were being attacked, the soldiers quickly determined that it was the Iraqi army firing their guns. "If they see something they don't like, they usually just fire their guns straight up in the air, sometimes for a very long time," one of the soldiers told me. "We've tried to get them to do it differently, but they haven’t listened to our tactical advice."

In a briefing on Thursday, Ambassador John Bennett told me that while many larger factors will determine the future of Iraq, patrols occur at a granular level. Wednesday and Thursday were a chance for me to step back from the big picture and get a better look at that granular level.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.