Baghdad: Embedded Provisional Reconstruction Teams

Baghdad: Embedded Provisional Reconstruction Teams
Counterterrorism Blog
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
May 31, 2007

A few days ago, I spoke with a U.S. official working for one of the new embedded provisional reconstruction teams (EPRTs) in Iraq. Last year ten provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs) were created throughout the country to operate parallel to the military. Each PRT was headed up by a foreign service officer; had a deputy from the U.S. Army; had at least one member from USAID; and had a bilingual, bicultural advisor (fluent in Arabic with a background that allows him to understand the Middle East). Typically there would be about ten people total working for a PRT. The PRTs were designed to further the U.S. mission in Iraq by helping to advance the political process of reconstruction in a variety of ways. Top-down change was characteristic of the PRTs: they would work with such political entities as city councils and the policymaking portion of a city's department of public works.

The EPRTs are different. Rather than operating separately from and parallel to the military, they are embedded within the military structure. Six EPRTs operate in Baghdad, three in Anbar, and one in Babil. Their structure is similar to that of the PRTs (run by a foreign service officer, featuring a U.S. Army deputy, a USAID member, a bicultural advisor, and other staffers) but rather than functioning in the top-down manner of the PRTs, the EPRTs are designed to make more of a difference at what the official called the "granular" level. That is, the EPRTs are integrated into the military's tactical operations, and are designed to advance reconstruction efforts on a street by street, neighborhood by neighborhood basis. I previously noted that the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery (with which I was embedded) has four lines of operation in the districts it patrols: security, governance, economy, and essential services. It is at this tactical level -- the level of how these lines of operation can be furthered -- that the EPRT is supposed to have an impact in helping to set the course for the units with which it works. The EPRTs help set this course all the way down to the platoon level.

The source working with the EPRT said that their job is as much "problem avoidance" as anything else. Moreover, because the EPRTs have only been active in Iraq for about six weeks, it's too early at this point to assess their effectiveness. However, I'll be interested to check in with people working with the new EPRTs several months down the line to see how this intriguing idea is working in practice.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

Service Support… It Ain’t as Easy as it Looks

Service Support… It Ain’t as Easy as it Looks
2BT Newsletter: Daggers Edge V1, Iss14
1st Lt. Chris Lowry
May 30, 2007

Flashback: So there we were, southern California at the National Training Center (NTC). This was supposed to be the ultimate test of our platoon. It was supposed to be the culmination of all of our training as a Forward Support Company (FSC). We were wellrehearsed and trained to standard in all aspects of Service Support, everything from vehicle load plans to Combat Logistic Patrol (CLP) battle drills. According to NTC standards we did exceptionally well. We were ready for deployment… Or were we?

Fast-forward to present day. As you may have already guessed, things did not turn out the way we had planned. Instead of running CLP, we were instructed to do something that none of us had ever done before. We were told that we were to be one of the battalion’s infantry platoons.

I know what you are thinking, “what does a service support platoon know about operating in the combat arms world?” Well, to be quite honest, we did not know much at the time. We had been training for the past year and a half doing nothing but combat logistic patrols. We had to cram a year of training into a little less than 10 days, because we were to augment an infantry company as it conducted route reconnaissance and observation missions for Arrowhead Strike IX. Since we were only operating at night, it was mandatory that we work only in blackout conditions. Luckily, we were already well trained in night operations from conducting our CLPs, so we incorporated that experience into our new mission of dismounted patrols. We went straight from the crawl phase to the run phase and were expected to function as a fully-trained infantry platoon. The standards were set forth by the infantry company Commander we were to operate under, all we had to do was meet them.

On the first night of operations, I could tell the guys were a little nervous and to be quiet honest, I was nervous myself. I had butterflies the size of a 10K generator flying around in my stomach. It felt like the night of the big game, and for us it was the big game. This was the time to show all those people who think the service support branches should be “in the rear, with the gear” that we could hang with the big dogs. And you know what? That is exactly what we did. We ran with the big dogs and not only met the standard, but exceeded it on multiple occasions.

First Platoon / G Company is now a full-time maneuver element, conducting the full spectrum of “combat arms” missions. We do everything the combat arms guys do with not only less training, but different equipment and a variety of different MOSs. We all have different types of backgrounds and schooling within the platoon. We have communications specialists, truck drivers, mechanics, and cooks, as well as fuel, wrecker, and crane operators. Some might look at that as a disadvantage, but I look at it as a major advantage. We are a wide assortment of Soldiers put into an extraordinary situation, but we have risen to the challenge and exceeded everyone’s expectations.

Featured Report from Iraq: A look at the surge from Baghdad (The Fourth Rail)

Featured Report from Iraq: A look at the surge from Baghdad
The Fourth Rail
By: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
May 29, 2007

Journalist Daveed Gartenstein-Ross was embedded with Pat's group --

U.S. strategy is not just military in nature. Rather, it is designed to eliminate some of the underlying conditions that sap the average Iraqi’s faith in the country’s civil society. For example, in the districts that 2-32 patrols -- Yarmouk and Hateen -- there are four lines of operation: security, governance, economy, and essential services. According to Major Brynt Parmeter, who works at the brigade level, the overall goals are to reduce sectarian fighting, increase the Iraqi security forces’ capabilities, and improve local government to empower it to provide the services that Iraqis need. The Iraqis lack a number of essential services. Right now the U.S. focus is on food centers, financial institutions, fuel, and medical needs—but the Iraqis are also lacking in trash collection, reliable sewers, electricity, and other services. The effect of the lack of essential services on Iraqis should not be underestimated. Gas cost 5 cents a liter under Saddam Hussein; now the official price has skyrocketed to about 70 cents a liter. But in practice it is far higher than that: according to Lieutenant Patrick Henson, there is only one government-run gas station in the Yarmouk district. When the long lines around the station are coupled with security concerns, it should come as no surprise that many Iraqis buy their gas from the black market, where prices can reach $2 a liter. In other words, Iraqis may be paying more for their gas than Americans -- and the average Iraqi income is substantially lower than the average American income.

Featured Report from Iraq: A look at the surge from Baghdad (The Fourth Rail)